Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) has numerous applications in the real world thanks to its outstanding ability in quickly adapting to the surrounding environments. Despite its great advantages, DRL is susceptible to adversarial attacks, which precludes its use in real-life critical systems and applications (e.g., smart grids, traffic controls, and autonomous vehicles) unless its vulnerabilities are addressed and mitigated. Thus, this paper provides a comprehensive survey that discusses emerging attacks in DRL-based systems and the potential countermeasures to defend against these attacks. We first cover some fundamental backgrounds about DRL and present emerging adversarial attacks on machine learning techniques. We then investigate more details of the vulnerabilities that the adversary can exploit to attack DRL along with the state-of-the-art countermeasures to prevent such attacks. Finally, we highlight open issues and research challenges for developing solutions to deal with attacks for DRL-based intelligent systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
The holy grail of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) is to develop a autonomous agents that can interact and learn from the surrounding environment to achieve their optimal policies. This long-standing challenge for developing intelligent agents is no longer a pipe dream thanks to rapid growth in computational AI and ML technologies. In the last decade, ML especially Deep Learning (DL) has revolutionized fields like computer vision, language processing, etc. ML is divided into three categories namely, supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement learning [1] . In supervised learning, training data along with the corresponding labels are available for decision making. Due to very high accuracy prediction, supervised learning is by far the most well-studied branch of ML, which has a lot of applications in practice such as object recognition, speech recognition, spam detection, pattern recognition and many more. For unsupervised learning, the decision making is independent of any supervisor which *equal contribution Corresponding email: muhammad.usama@itu.edu.pk precisely means that the learning is performed without knowing the true labels of the input data. Reinforcement learning (RL) is defined as a learning process which tries to find the best actions for agents to perform at states based on information they observe while interacting with surrounding environment. Unlike supervised and unsupervised learning processes which need data in advance before learning processes, RL agents can learn in an online manner, based on observations obtained through real-time interactions with the environment.
Since RL is a stochastic trial and error process, it is used to solve many difficult sequential decision-making problems in robotics, controls, and many other real-world problems but RL algorithms have some limitations to implement in practice mainly due to a long-time interaction learning process. In particular, it usually takes a lot of time (from a few hours to a few weeks) for RL algorithms to be converged. Recently, a new technique combining the advancement of DL to ameliorate the limitations of RL, called deep reinforcement learning (DRL) has been introduced [2] . DRL has caught the imagination of the research community and was listed as one of ten breakthrough technologies in 2017 by MIT Technology Review.
DRL has shown great results in many complex decision making processes such as designated task completion in robotics [3] , navigating driver-less autonomous vehicles [4] , [5] , healthcare [6] , financial trading [7] , smart grids management [8] , automated transportation management [9] , wireless and data networks management [10] , and for playing video games such as Pong [2] , Go [11] , etc. In 2017, DRL beat the human champions in the game of Go [12] and most recently a team of five DRL agents has beaten the world champion human team in Dota2 matches 1 . This shows that DRL is a breakthrough technology which allows to address very highcomplex and time-sensitive decision making problems in realtime.
With the rapid adoption of the DRL in critical real-world applications, the security of DRL has become a very impor-Introduction Fig. 1 : Organization of the paper. tant area of research. Recently DRL is found vulnerable to adversarial attacks, where an imperceptible perturbation is added to the input to the DRL schemes with a pre-defined goal of causing a malfunction in the DRL learning process [13] . This makes it necessary to understand the types and nature of these adversarial vulnerabilities and their potential mitigation procedures before deploying the DRL-based reallife critical systems (e.g. smart grids, autonomous vehicles, etc.). Here we want to note that the security of supervised and unsupervised ML is well studied in the literature [14] but the security of the DRL has not yet received similar attention. In 2018, Behzadan et al. [15] reviewed the security vulnerabilities and open challenges in DRL, although it provides a good initial review of the security concerns but it does not properly cover the security issues associated with four major components of DRL pipeline (environment, observation, policy, and reward) and related robustness mechanisms. We aim to fulfill this requirement by providing a comprehensive survey on attack and defense techniques together with a discussion of the future research directions on DRL.
Contributions of this paper: In this paper, we build upon the existing literature available on security vulnerabilities of DRL and their countermeasure and provide a comprehensive review of that literature. Following are the major contributions of this paper.
• We provide the fundamental knowledge about DRL along with a non-exhaustive taxonomy of advanced DRL algorithms. • We then present a comprehensive survey of adversarial attacks on DRL and their potential countermeasures.
• We also provide the available benchmarks and metrics for the robustness of DRL. • Finally, we discuss the open issues and research challenges in the robustness of DRL and potential research directions. Organization of the Paper: The organization of this paper is depicted in Figure 1 . A detailed overview of prominent DRL schemes, along with the various challenges associated with them, is presented in Section II. Section III presents a comprehensive review of adversarial ML attacks on the DRL pipeline. A detailed overview of defenses proposed in the literature to ensure robustness against adversarial attacks is presented in Section IV. Section V presents the available benchmarking tools and metrics along with open research problems in DRL. Section VI describes the open issues and research challenges in designing adversarial attacks and robustness mechanisms for DRL. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VII. For the convenience of the reader, a summary of the salient acronyms used in this paper is presented in Table I .
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we first provide a brief description of the Markov decision process (MDP). Then, we discuss the fundamental definitions involved in the DRL process. Finally, we provide a summary of DRL techniques and their potential shortcomings.
A generic RL problem is described as an MDP, described by state, action, reward, and dynamics of the system. In an MDP, at each decision time epoch, e.g., a time step, the agent observes the current state s t and performs an action a t based on its current optimal policy π * . After the action is executed, the agent observes its reward r t and next state s t+1 obtained at the end of the time step. The aim of MDP is to find the best actions which maximize its long-term average reward. Fig. 2 illustrates a typical MDP with an agent interacting with its surrounding environment. The important concepts used in DRL are described as follows:
• Environment is a simulator or a real-world scenario in which the agent interacts and learns. At each time step, the agent interacts with the environment governed by the policy and in return gets a reward which determines the quality of the action. Environment is divided into two categories namely fully observable, and partially observable. In a fully observable environment, the agent can observe all information of the environment. For partially observable environment, the agent can only observe some information of the environment. • Policy defines how the agent will behave in the environment at a particular time. In other words, it is a mapping from the perceived states of the environment to the actions taken in those conditions. Policies are further divided into two types: namely deterministic policy and stochastic policy. When actions taken by the agent are deterministic, the policy is termed as deterministic. On the other hand, when the actions are sampled from a probability distribution function of environment states, the policy is called to be stochastic. • On-policy algorithms enable an agent to learn and update its policy in an online manner through realtime interaction with the environment. Samples generated from a pre-known target policy can be used to train the algorithm to estimate the policy in advance. • Off-policy algorithms use an online policy and a target policy. The target policy is used to estimate the action values while the online policy is being learned. After a certain interval of time, the target policy is updated with the online policy. Hence, the agent can estimate the target policy without its complete knowledge. • Action is a stimulus used by the agent for interaction with the environment. The actions can be discrete and continuous based on the environment and DRL problem formulation. • Reward is an incentive, usually expressed by a numerical value, the agent receives after making an action. The goal of an agent is to maximize the accumulative reward. • Model mimics the behavior of the environment, hence allowing inferences to be made about the behavior of the environment. Based on the availability of models, the DRL schemes can be divided into two categories namely model-based and model-free RL. • Value function specifies the value of a state. Value is defined as the maximum expected accumulative reward an agent may get from a specific state. Mathematically, it is determined as in equation (1).
. • Q-function specifies the Q-value of a state. Q-value is defined as the maximum expected accumulative reward an agent may get by taking a specific action at a specific state. Mathematically, it can be calculated as follows:
. • Exploration and exploitation: Exploration is the process when the agent tries to explore the surrounding environment by taking different actions available at a given state. Exploitation occurs after exploration. The agent exploits the optimal actions to get the best accumulated reward. An -greedy policy is used to balance between exploration and exploitation. The agent chooses a random action with a certain probability otherwise it takes the action proposed by the policy. The DRL can be divided into two major categories namely model-free and model-based RL algorithms 2 . These categories are based on whether a model is not being used or being used while learning, respectively. Model-free RL methods can learn directly from real-time interactions with the environment, while model-based RL methods can learn offline by using simulated model, resulting in an increased sample efficiency.
A. Model-free RL
In model-free RL, the focus is on calculating the value function directly from the interactions with the environment. Model-free RL is further divided into two parts namely Qlearning and policy optimization.
1) Q-learning: Q-Learning was proposed by Watkins et al. [16] where the concept of learning the Q-values Q(s t , a t ) has been shown to be useful in solving the dynamic learning problems. The main aim of the Q-learning algorithm is to maximize the Q-value function iteratively following the equation (3), where s t+1 is the new state in the MDP based on the action taken in previous state s t and a t+1 is a possible action in s t+1 . α expresses the learning rate and i shows the iteration.
Q-learning determines the optimal policy by using the Bellman equation given in equation (4) .
Although the Q-learning algorithm has been demonstrated to be able to achieve good performance in solving sequential decision-making problems, it has following limitations:
• A slight change in the Q values will introduce chaotic behavior in the policy estimation, which is not desirable. • If the action space is in real numbers, the state-space can grow to be infinitely large, and thus processing such infinitely large state-space is intractable. • The Q-learning training process provided in equations (3) and (4) takes consecutive samples to learn, and usually successive samples are correlated, which violates the independent and identically distributed assumption of the training process.
To overcome these issues, Google DeepMind 3 demonstrate that an RL algorithm based on DNN [2] can handle large state-space and can perform human-level tasks such as playing Atari games. The proposed architecture is termed as DQN. DQN is an off-policy algorithm and it uses the principle of exploration during learning. The main purpose of the DQN is to learn the spatio-temporal features of the high dimensional input. The strength of the DQN lies in the ability to both approximating the Q-functions and representing the highdimensional observations. Mnih et al. [2] noted that RL is known to be unstable, and the method of using nonlinear function approximators for representing the action values is bound to diverge. This will result in small updates in Q-values significantly changing the policy. Mnih et al. propose using experience replay and target network to stabilize the learning process.
Experience replay is defined as a procedure of storing previous experiences of the agent in the memory. This allows the DRL algorithm to be able to sample random batches from the memory and learn from previously observed data offline. The older samples are discarded as time progresses. Experience replay greatly reduces the variance and the number of interactions required by the agent to learn from the environment. The target network process is another DNN that is presented along with the actual online DNN used in DQN for representing the online policy. The weights of this network are updated with the weights of the online network on specific intervals while those of the online one are updated at each iteration. The estimates of Q-values that are being learned by the online network are fluctuating rapidly. These two methods introduced in DQN can help achieve a better policy than the previous simple Q-learning. Nair et al. [17] introduce a distributed DQN and develope a framework for training multiple DQN in parallel. They show an increase in performance and a reduction in the training time.
Van et al. [18] show that the DQN may overestimate the Q-values and propose a new method called double deep Qlearning (DDQN). In [18] , it is proved that the estimator used in DQN overestimates the expected return because the maximum action value is used as an approximation of the expected value. In DDQN, the action selection is proposed by an online network, but its value estimation for the update is done by using a target network. By using online and target networks, a better estimate of the policy can be learned to achieve greater performance. Wang et al. [19] propose a dueling architecture that ensures the generalization in learning across actions without affecting the underlying DRL process. The motivation behind separating the state values and statedependent action advantages via two separate streams is to show that it is unnecessary to know the value of each action at every time-step unless a valuable state is in danger of suffering a loss.
Hausknecht et al. [20] propose Deep Recurrent Q-Network (DRQN), in which a combination of Q-functions with recurrent neural networks (RNN) is used for learning the Qvalues. Since RNN are used for learning, they will provide a better learning opportunity in the case of partially observable environments by integrating information over long periods. So, the algorithm will be able to reach the optimal sequences where the optimal states lie far from each other in terms of time. DRQN can achieve better performance in the game of "pong" where a deep recurrence produces a better policy [20] . Deep attention recurrent Q-networks (DARQN) [21] is the combination of DRQN with an attention learning scheme. This makes the DNN aware of the position (where to focus), hence making it capable of long-term planning. It outperforms both DQNs and DRQNs due to this capability. The uses of DRQNs and DARQNs are not limited to learning value-functions. They can be applied to policy search and actor-critic methods. Fortunato et al. [22] propose noisy DQN where a functional noise is added to the DNN policy instead of state-space which in turn forces the agent to learn better parameters for DQN. This noisy exploration process provides a superhuman performance on Atari games [22] at the cost of a smaller computational overhead. Hessel et al. [23] propose Rainbow DQN where they combine all independent improvement made in DQN procedure and show the contribution of each independent improvement in the overall DQN learning procedure.
2) Policy optimization: Policy optimization is the process of directly searching for an optimal policy by using gradientbased or gradient-less schemes. Gradient-free methods are especially useful in cases of low-dimensional problems, while for high-dimensional problems, policy-gradient methods are the best method for dealing with high-dimensionality and sample efficiency. The policy π(a|s; θ) is a probability distribution π over action a when observing state s, where θ is a neural network that parameterizes the policy π. The policy gradient theorem, provided in equation (5) , is defined as the derivative of the projected reward which is defined as the expected value of the product of the reward and gradient of the log of the policy [24] .
where π θ is given as:
π θ (a t |s t )p(s t+1 , r t+1 |s t , a t ).
Although policy gradient methods represent the most popular continuous-action DRL algorithm, these methods have some limitations such as high variance, noisy gradients, batch sizes, and non-applicability (in case of non-differentiable policies). Optimization becomes difficult when the state-space of the RL problem is large or continuous. Policy gradient and actor-critic methods can be used to mitigate this problem by looking for a local optimum. Silver et al. [25] introduce and demonstrate an off-policy actor-critic algorithm that can vastly improve upon a stochastic policy gradient (SPG) for the case of continuous spaces. DPG, when combined with DL, gives rise to DDPG [26] . Although DDPG works fine in the realworld continuous time problems, it requires a lot of training to search for a good enough policy.
In DRL, we want to keep as close to the original model as possible and try not to reach a local cost minimum. Levine et al. [27] propose a solution to this problem by using supervised learning in combination with importance sampling to learn the optimal policy. This technique helps the agent reach the optimal maximum reward. The policy-search is model-free but is guided by a model-based algorithm. This technique is shown to be successful in simulated environments [28] , [29] . A similar approach called asynchronous advantage actor-critic (A3C) algorithm where multiple local policies are used to learn an optimal global policy [30] . Formally, A3C combines advantage updates with the actor-critic formulation to learn the optimal global policy. The policy is updated asynchronously by the multiple CPUs presented on a single machine or distributed across the cluster. The use of the multiple independent agents not only stabilizes the network, but also improves the exploration. It is applied in a real-world robotics application by Zhu et al. [31] while using high-dimensional visual inputs. On the other hand, the Advantage Actor-Critic (A2C) algorithm [30] uses a single-threaded learner to sample from separate environment instances and collects all data into one mini-batch to compute the gradient.
While learning the policy, dynamic state-distribution causes a serious problem as change in the state distribution will cause an oscillation in policy learning. Therefore, the policy updates are needed to be more carefully crafted. An advantage function is used for the policy updates. As long as the advantages are positive, the policy will always be in a better direction. Fitting these advantage functions is based on the gradient update step of RL process and determining an appropriate size of the gradient step is very challenging. For this exact purpose, trust regions policy optimization (TRPO) was proposed by Schulman et al. [32] . The difference between the new and the current policy is found using Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. This restricts the optimization steps to lie in a trusted region and hence prevents the new policies from diverging too far in the case of a bad update. The TRPO is shown to be relatively more robust and more applicable in the real environments where the agent has to deal with very high-dimensional input. By combining the TRPO with modellearning, better results can be achieved where the model is trained in a simulated environment and deployed in a real dynamic environment. Later Schulman et al. [33] propose proximal policy optimization (PPO) as an update to TRPO. [33] perform unconstrained optimization, requiring only the information of the first-order gradient. The major features of PPO are the improvement of sample complexity, ease of implementation, and low sensitivity to parameter tuning. It updates the parameters using mini-batches from each set of samples. The PPO is able to retain the performance of TRPO with low complexity. More details on model-free schemes can be found in [34] .
B. Model-Based RL
In model-based DRL the optimal learning trajectory is defined using the model of the environment. Model-based RL is a very less explored area of research. The model-based RL techniques can be divided into two types, one in which the model is already given and the other in which the model is needed to be learned. Training these model-based DRL algorithms requires a large number of samples than those of the normal model-based RL algorithms. Racaniere et al. [35] introduce imagination augmented agents (I2A) as both a model-based and model-free technique. The major difference between I2A and other model-based techniques is that it does not use the model to arrive at policy but uses the predictions from the model to construct an implicit plan. It shows to have improved robustness to model misspecifications and outperforms the baseline model-free algorithms in games like Pacman and Sokoban. These results enlighten the future prospects of model-based RL. Nagabandi et al. [36] introduce model-based priors for model-free reinforcement learning (MBMF) where sample complexity of model-based DRL scheme is improved by using another medium-sized network with model predictive control (MPC). MBMF is tested on multiple MuJoCo (Multi-Joint dynamics with Contact) environments including hopper, swimmer, cheetah, and ant agents. MBMF shows a sample efficiency (the efficiency in terms of requiring less samples for training) of 3-5 times than the model-free algorithms. Due to the sample efficiency, the learning is fast as compared to those of model-free algorithms. Feinberg et al. [37] introduce modelbased value expansion (MVE) as a solution to deal with the uncertainty caused by imagining data to speed up the learning process.
Buckman et al. [38] introduce stochastic ensemble value expansion (STEVE) as a technique to combine model-free algorithms with model-based algorithms while saving from a fall in performance due to errors in the model. The algorithm chooses dynamically between the model-free and model-based approach and uses the defined model only if switching between model-based and model-free starts introducing errors in the learning. STEVE outperforms the model-free baselines in continuous control tasks while achieving a superior sample efficiency in robo-school-humanoid-v1 and robo-school-humanoid-flagrun-v1 gaming environments. Kurutuch et al. [39] model ensemble trust region policy optimization (ME-TRPO) as a sample-efficient solution to maintain the modeluncertainty and regularize the learning process in cases of insufficient data available for training. The performance of the algorithm is reported on games like cheetah, swimmer, hopper, snake, ant, and Humanoid. It shows a noticeable improvement over the previously proposed state-of-the-art algorithms in terms of sample efficiency. Thus, there are techniques in which the model does not need to be learned as it is already given like the famous AlphaZero [12] and Exlt [40] . Further details on model-based RL can be found in [34] .
C. Security of ML
Although the utilization of ML techniques has revolutionized many areas like vision, language, speech, and control; it has also introduced new security challenges that are very threatening in designing and developing new dynamic intelligent systems. Security attacks in ML can be divided into two categories namely training phase attacks and inference phase attacks. For training phase attacks, also known as poisoning attacks, the adversary tries to force the learning process to learn faulty model/policy by introducing small imperceptible perturbations to the input data. Inference phase attacks, also known as evasion attacks, are performed by the adversary at the inference/test time of the ML pipeline to fool the model/policy in providing malfunctioned results/actions.
The imperceptible perturbation used for crafting malicious input for the ML model is known as a adversarial perturbation, whereas the malicious input used for performing evasion attack on ML pipeline is known as an adversarial example. Adversarial examples are classified into three major categories based on the objective, knowledge, and specificity. Formally, an adversarial example x * is created by adding a small imperceptible carefully crafted perturbation δ to the correctly classified example x. The perturbation δ is calculated by approximating the optimization problem given in equation (7) iteratively until the crafted adversarial example gets classified by ML classifier f (.) in targeted class t. Figure 4 shows a basic taxonomy of attacks on ML.
1) Attacks based on adversary's knowledge: Depending on the adversary's knowledge about the targeted ML model, adversarial attacks are divided into further three categories namely white-box attacks, gray-box attacks, and black-box attacks. In the case of white-box attacks, the adversary has the perfect knowledge of the target ML/DL algorithm, i.e., the adversary knows the training and testing data, parameters of the model, etc. These attacks are used for the worst-case security malfunction analysis of an ML/DL system. In the case of gray-box attacks, the adversary is supposed to have limited knowledge (knowledge about feature representation and optimization algorithms only) about the targeted ML/DL model. Adversary designs a surrogate model on the limited knowledge available and uses transferability property [41] of the adversarial examples (where an adversarial example evading a classifier will evade other similar classifiers even if they are trained in other dataset) to evade the ML/DL based system. The attacker may also have limited test access to the model, i.e., he may be able to ask the model the output on some inputs. In the case of black-box attacks, the adversary does not know the model or any of its attributes. The adversary can only query the systems for labels or confidence score and develop an adversarial perturbation based on the feedback provided by the deployed ML/DL model.
2) Attacks based on adversary's goals: Based on the adversary's objective, adversarial attacks are divided in four types: 1) confidence reduction attacks in which adversarial attacks are launched to compromise the accuracy of the deployed ML/DL based system; 2) misclassification attacks in which adversarial attacks are launched for disturbing the classification boundary of any class to cause misclassification; 3) targeted misclassification attacks in which adversarial attacks are launched to misclassify only a targeted class; 4) source/target misclassification attacks in which adversarial attacks are launched to force misclassification of a specific source class into a specifically targeted class.
3) Attacks based on adversary's specificity: Based on specificity, adversarial examples can be classified into two types, i.e., targeted and non-targeted. These concepts are similar to the ones as in the case of the adversary's objective. In the case of targeted attacks, the attackers target specific classes in the output, while in the case of non-targeted attacks, the goal is to misclassify the maximum number of samples. 4) Adversarial transferability: In 2016, Papernot et al. [42] showed the adversarial examples to be transferable among different models, implying that adversarial examples generated for one ML model will work as an adversarial sample for other ML models trained for a similar task with high probability. The authors divide transferability into two types:
(1) cross-model/cross-technique transferability in which the same adversarial sample is being misclassified by different ML algorithms; and (2) cross-training-set/intra-technique transferability in which the same adversarial sample being misclassified by models trained on subsets of the same training set. This property of transferability greatly reduces the minimum knowledge that adversaries must possess of a machine learning classifier to force it to misclassify inputs that they crafted. Hence, an adversary can train his model (not knowing the target model), to generate adversarial samples, and use them to evade the target model.
D. Security of DRL
The increasing use of DRL in practical applications has led to an investigation of the security risks it faces. However, the security challenges faced by DRL are different from those experienced by other ML algorithms. The major difference is that a DRL process is trained to solve sequential decisionmaking problems in contrast to most other ML schemes that are trained to solve single-step prediction problems. The interdependence of the current actions on the previous ones increases the degrees-of-freedom of adversarial attacks raising new challenges that must be addressed. This makes the adversarial attacks more challenging to be recognized, as we cannot discriminate between the action intentionally taken by the agent and the action the adversary forces/lures the agent to take. Also, the training is done on a dataset from a fixed distribution in the case of ML, in contrast to the DRL where the agent begins with a deterministic or stochastic policy and starts exploring for best actions.
Usually, RL problems are formulated as an MDP consisting of four parts (s,a,r,p). Hence, an adversary has more choices to attack. If the adversary targets the state space, imperceptible perturbations can be added to the environment directly by perturbing the sensors [43] . Similarly, an adversary can target any of the four major components of MDP. Adversarial attacks on DRL are classified into inference-time and training-time attacks. An adversary may compromise one or more than one dimension of confidentiality, integrity, and availability [15] .
Based on the goal of the adversary, the adversarial attacks on DRL can be classified into active or passive. For active attacks, then the adversary desires to change the behavior of the agent, while for passive attacks, the adversary desires to infer details about the model, reward function, or other parts of DRL. An adversary can use these details to either create a copy of the model or use them to perform an attack on the model. The adversary may be limited by the part of the environment, where an adversary is only capable of making changes to a certain area of the environment. Adding a lot of perturbation in a single time instance is not desirable as it makes the attack perceptible which is not desired by the adversary. Distinguishing the adversarial samples from the normal ones in the case of DRL is not as easy as in supervised learning (in which the problem is simpler due to the availability of labels).
It is important to note here that the problem of secure RL is different from the problem of safe RL [44] , [45] . The goal of safe RL is to learn policies to minimize the expectation of reward. In contrast, the goal of secure RL is to make the learning process robust and resilient to adversarial attacks. For example, in the case of a robot given a task to navigate through a maze, the goal is to reach the specified destination. This robot can be attacked by an adversary and mislead to reach a destination specified by the adversary which is different from the target one. The goal of secure RL is to make the DRL model robust and resilient to such adversarial attacks. Though safe RL and secure RL overlap, different approaches are employed for each of these.
III. ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS ON DRL
In this section, we discuss the adversarial attacks on DRL. We divide the attacks on DRL into four categories based on the functional components of the DRL process. Table II shows a summary of the adversarial attacks on DRL. Figure 8 shows a basic taxonomy of adversarial attacks on DRL based on the adversary's target.
A. Attacks Targeting the Reward
An adversary may choose to either perturb the reward directly or even perturb it indirectly by altering the parts of the MDP it has access to. Figure 6 shows a basic depiction of governing an adversarial attack on the DRL agent's reward.
1) Attacks directly perturbing the reward: In 2018, Han et al. [46] discuss the reaction of the DRL agent in softwaredefined networking to different adversarial attacks. The DRL techniques introduced by Han et al. [46] are DDQN and A3C. The adversary adopts white-box and black-box settings for both inference and poisoning attacks in an online setting. They propose two kinds of attacks: flipping reward signals and manipulating states. For flipping reward signals, the adversary can manipulate the reward signal of the model by flipping it for a certain number of times. For state manipulation, the attacker makes two changes in the first few steps of the training, i.e., an adversary can add one false positive and one false negative in the states. Hence, the adversary is able to change the label of one compromised node to be uncompromised and vice versa.
Huang et al. [47] discuss the effect of malicious falsification of the reward signal on the agent leading it into taking targeted decisions. They characterize a robust region for policy in which the adversary can never achieve the desired policy while keeping the cost in this region. They use four terms to specify different types of attackers: namely (1) omniscient attacker who has all the information before a certain time t; (2) peer attacker who does not know about the transition probabilities but has access to the knowledge the agent has before a time t;
(3) ignorant attacker who only knows the cost signals before a time t; and (4) blind attacker that has no information at time t. All these attackers may be limited by the budget of the attack and other constraints. It is shown that by the falsification of the cost at each state, all of these adversaries can mislead the agent into learning a policy desired by the adversary.
2) Adversarial attack on reward signals by perturbing the states: Pattanaik et al. [48] propose three types of gradientbased adversarial attacks on DQN and DDPG techniques for reducing the expected reward by adding perturbations to the observations. They argue that the previous attacks on DRL based on FGSM [49] are not using an optimal cost function for crafting the adversarial inputs. They also show that the proposed attacks perform better than simple FGSM attack in decaying the performance of DRL schemes.
The first attack is based on a naive approach of adding random noise to the DRL states to mislead the DRL agent in selecting a sub-optimal action that decays the performance of the DRL scheme. The second attack is a gradient-based (GB) attack, where a novel cost function is introduced for creating adversarial actions, that outperforms the FGSM in finding out the worst possible discrete action to limit the performance of DRL schemes. The third attack is an improved version of the second attack. Instead of using a simple gradient-based approach for generating adversarial perturbation, the authors use stochastic gradient descent (SGD) for adversarial action generation which ultimately misleads the DRL agent to end up in a pre-defined adversarial state. The authors validate these attacks by testing them on DDQN and RBFG agents which were trained in the cart pole and mountain car environments. The authors also compare the results of their proposed attacks and show that their gradient-based attack works better in deteriorating the performance of both types of agents.
3) Adversarial attacks on reward signals by perturbing the action space: Yeow et al. [50] propose two attacks on the action space of the DRL algorithms. The first one is an optimization problem for minimizing the cumulative reward of the DRL agent with decoupled constraints called myopic action space (MAS) attack. The second one has the same objective as the first one but with temporally coupled constraints called look-ahead Action Space (LAS) attack. The results show that LAS is more lethal in deteriorating the performance of the DRL algorithm as it can attack the dynamic information of the agent. This attack is also shown to perform well in the case of limited resources. Such attacks can be used to gain insights into the potential vulnerabilities of the DRL model. Yeow et al. [50] also speculate that their proposed attacks on reward signals by perturbing the action space cannot be defended as the action space is independent of the policy. However, it can be detected by having a look at the decay in the reward. They show their results on PPO [33] trained on the Lunar-Lander environment and DDQNs trained on both Lunar-Lander and BiPedal Walker.
B. Attacks Targeting the Policy
The adversary can both directly or indirectly target the policy of the DRL agent. Figure 7 shows a basic depiction of governing an adversarial attack on the policy.
1) Adversarial attacks on DRL policy by perturbing the states: Huang et al. [51] show the effect of adversarial attacks on neural network policies in DRL. They use the FGSM attack to introduce perturbations in raw input of the DRL policy which results in a significant drop in the performance of DQN, TRPO, and A3C methods in both white and black-box settings. The same FGSM attack, as suggested in [13] , is used for attacking A3C and TRPO, and it is reported that both schemes show the same vulnerabilities. The performance of the attack on A3C and TRPO is also compared with DQN and it is demonstrated that DQN is more susceptible to adversarial attacks than those of the TRPO and A3C. Huang et al. [51] also discuss different settings of black-box attacks: one in which the adversary knows the environment, the training algorithm and the hyperparameters but not the random initialization; and the other one in which the adversary does not have any knowledge of the training model or hyperparameters. A flow of the attacks carried out by Huang et al. [51] is shown in Figure 9 .
Unlike [51] , Lin et al. [52] consider a different approach and propose two adversarial attack techniques on DRL schemes, namely, strategically-timed attack and enchanting attacks. These attacks are based on the argument that previously discussed FGSM attacks may not be practically feasible and easy to detect. For strategically-timed attacks, they propose to minimize the reward of the DRL schemes by using adversarial Fig. 8 : Four major classes of DRL vulnerabilities based on the adversary's target. Fig. 9 : Two approaches for generating adversarial examples, applied to a policy trained using DQN [2] to play Pong as shown in [51] . Top: The adversarial example is computed using the FGSM with an ∞-norm constraint on the adversarial perturbation. Bottom: The adversarial example is computed using FGSM with an 1-norm constraint; the optimal perturbation is to create a fake ball lower than the position of the actual ball. examples on a subset of time steps in an episode of the DRL operation. For enchanting attacks Lin et al. [52] propose a novel method of luring the DRL agent to a predefined targeted state by using a generative model and a sophisticated planning algorithm. The generative model is used to predict the next state in the space and the planning algorithm is used to generate actions required for luring the agent to the targeted state. Performance of strategically-timed attack and enchanting attack are reported on DQN and A3C agents, playing five Atari games where a 70% of the success rate of the adversarial attacks is reported. [52] use the Carlini and Wagner (C&W) attack [53] for generating adversarial inputs. It is also shown that perturbing only 25% of the inputs using the proposed method produces the same results as the previously proposed attacks based on FGSM. A description of the working of the enchanting attack is given in Figure 10 .
Kos et al. [54] test the effects of adversarial examples and random noise on the DRL policies. They argue that the FGSMbased adversarial examples perform better than random noise. They also show that the proposed method uses the value function to guide the adversarial perturbation injection which reduces the number of adversarial perturbations needed for introducing a malfunction in DRL policies. It is further argued that perturbing all states may not be practically feasible so three types of attack situations are proposed: (1) the addition of noise at a fixed frequency; (2) the addition of specially designed perturbed inputs after N samples; (3) the recalculation of the perturbation after N samples and adding the previously calculated perturbation to the intermediate steps. The results show their last approach of recalculating adversarial inputs performs as good as the one in which all states are perturbed.
The proposed attacks are also tested for re-training with adversarial examples and random noise to show that resilience can be improved against both FGSM adversarial perturbations and random noise. The proposed method successfully deteriorates the performance of the Atari Pong playing agent which uses A3C scheme.
Tretschk et al. [55] propose a similar approach to the enchanting attacks proposed by Lin et al. [52] where they use the adversarial transformer network (ATN) [56] to impose adversarial reward on the policy network of DRL. The ATN makes the agent maximize the adversarial reward through a sequence of adversarial inputs. Complete information regarding the agent and the target environment is required, hence making the attach white box. The experiments are performed on a DQN trained for playing Pong. It is shown that given a large-enough threshold for perturbation, the agent can be made to follow the adversarial policy at the test time. Figure 11 shows a basic illustration of the threat model used by Tretschk et al. [55] . Kiourti et al. [57] show the vulnerability of DRL models to Trojan attacks with adversary having access to the training phase of the model. An adversary may create and hide some deficiencies in the policy to use them later for his benefit. It is reported that by only modifying 0.025% of the training data, an adversary can induce such hidden behaviors in the policy that the models perform perfectly well until the Trojan is triggered. The proposed attack is shown to be resistant against current defense techniques for Trojans. The results of the attacks are reported on A2C in six different gaming environments: Pong, Space Invaders, Qbert, Breakout, Seaquest, and Crazy Climber.
Behzadan et al. [58] present a technique for watermarking DRL policies from saving them from model extraction attacks. This involves the integration of a unique response to a specific sequence of states while keeping its impact on performance minimum, hence saving from the unauthorized replication of policies. The results are reported on a DQN trained in a CartPole environment. It is also shown that the unwatermarked policies are not able to follow the identified trajectory which is specified during the training. This technique is similar to the Trojan attacks proposed by Kiourti et al. [57] and can be used by adversaries to hide specific patterns in the policy and use them to their benefit later.
2) Model extraction attacks: Behzadan et al. [59] propose an adversarial attack for targeting the confidentiality of the DRL policy. The proposed attack performs a model extraction attack by using imitation learning while querying the original model iteratively. They show that the adversarial examples generated for the model extracted are transferred successfully to the original model hence affecting its performance in a black-box setting. They use FGSM for generating adversarial examples for the imitated model. The results of the proposed attack are reported on DQN, A2C, and PPO [33] trained in a CartPole environment. It is also shown that by providing the attack a sufficient number of observations, adversarial examples can be crafted with high efficiency. They use adversarial regret, i.e., the difference between maximum return achievable by the trained policy π and return achieved from actions of adversarial policy, as a metric to measure the performance of their attacks. They show an increase in adversarial regret in case of adversarial policy.
3) Adversarial attacks on DRL policy by perturbing the environment: Hussenot et al. [60] propose two types of adversarial attacks to make a DRL agent to follow a desired policy. The first one called per-observation attack that includes the creation of adversarial perturbation for every observation of the agent and adding that perturbation to the environment. The second one called constant attack includes the addition of one universal perturbation, created at the start of the attack, to all the observations. These attacks are discussed in both the targeted and non-targeted situations. In the case of the targeted attack, the constant attack is also termed as universal mask attack. The results of both the attacks are reported on DQN and Rainbow DQN trained on four Atari games, namely Pong, Space Invaders, Air Raid, and HERO. It is also reported that the proposed attacks are more successful if the FGSM is used for generating the perturbations in untargeted attack situations, whereas in the case of targeted attacks the FGSM is not able to generate imperceptible adversarial samples. 4) Adversarial attacks on DRL policy by involving an adversarial agent: Gleave et al. [61] propose a novel threat algorithm in which the adversary is controlling an adversary agent in the same environment with the legitimate agent. The adversary is not able to manipulate the observations of the legitimate agent but can create natural observations that can act as adversarial inputs and make the agent follow desired policy. This leads to a zero-sum game between the adversarial agent and the legitimate agent. The results show that the adversary can win the game by confusing the legitimate agent. The adversarial agent is based on PPO and the victim agent is based on LSTM and MLP. After showing the existence of such adversarial policies, it is suggested that the model should be frozen after performing the learning to save it from learning undesired behaviors. Such adversarial agents can also be used in making the models better by constantly attacking and retraining.
C. Attacks Targeting the Observation
As discussed previously that while targeting the observation (states and sensors of the DRL pipeline), the attacker can manipulate the sensory data or the sensors directly. Figure  12 shows a basic depiction of adversarial attacks on the observations of the DRL agent.
1) Attacks perturbing the states: Behzadan et al. [13] show that the DQN is vulnerable to adversarial attacks and verify the transferability of adversarial examples across different DQN models. For this attack, the authors exploit the fact that DNN is a core part of DQN. Thus, if DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations then DQN can also be compromised by carefully crafting imperceptible adversarial examples. [13] consider a man-in-the-middle adversary between the environment and the DRL agent, where the adversary takes the states from the environment to perturb them and then forwards the perturbed states to the DRL agent to take the desired action. To ensure the imperceptibility of the perturbation, the amplitude of the adversarial examples crafting algorithms (FGSM and JSMA [62] ) is controlled.
The attack procedure is divided into two phases, initialization and exploitation. The initialization phase includes the training of a DQN on adversarial reward function to generate an adversarial policy. Then a replica of the target's DQN Fig. 13 : The process of policy induction attack [13] is performed on the game of pong. is created and is initialized from random parameters. The exploitation phase includes generating adversarial inputs such that the target DQN can be made to follow actions governed by the adversarial policy. Furthermore, Behzadan et al. [13] also propose an attack method to manipulate the policy of the DQN by exploiting the transferability of adversarial samples. They use a black-box setting and show a success rate of 70% when adversarial examples are transferred from one model to another. The cycle of policy induction attack proposed in [13] is shown in Figure 13 .
The research on real-time attacks on robotic systems in a dynamic environment has recently been explored. In 2018, Clark et al. [43] evaluate a white-box adversarial attack on the DRL policy of an autonomous robot in a dynamic environment. The goal of the DRL robot is to reach the destination by routing through the environment, while the goal of the adversary is to mislead the agent into the wrong routes. The adversary generates false routes by tempering sensory data sending to the robot to make the robot to see what the adversary desires. The attack is shown to be successful in deviating the robot from the optimal route. They also observe that once the adversarial input is removed, the robot automatically reverts to taking the correct route. Hence, an attacker can modify the behavior of the model temporarily and leave behind zero or very little evidence. It requires access to the trained policy but not the hyperparameters used during training.
D. Attacks Targeting the Environment
Another way of performing an adversarial attack on DRL is compromising the environment. Figure 14 The proposed adversarial attack is tested on A3C trained for pathfinding. It is reported that the proposed adversarial attack is successful at least 99.91% of the time. The core idea of their attack is the addition of confusing obstacles to the original clean map to confuse the robot by messing with its local information. For a perturbation to be successful, it should either stop the agent from reaching the destination or otherwise delay the agent. Examples of adversarial images generated by their proposed technique are shown in Figure 15 .
Bai et al. [64] propose a method of finding adversarial examples for DQNs trained for automatic pathfinding. This attack works on first making a DQN learn how to solve the problem of pathfinding and then analyzing it. Based on the analysis, weaknesses presented in the Q-value curves are identified. The attack involves the addition of adversarial examples generated from these weaknesses to the environment. This method is able to achieve a drop in performance by generating successful perturbations in the environment hence stopping the robot to achieve an optimal solution to the maze.
Xiao et al. [65] introduce online sequential attacks on the environment of the DRL agent by exploiting the temporal consistency of the states. Their attack performs faster than the FGSM algorithm as no back-propagation is needed. This attack is based on model querying and the authors provide two methods for this, namely adaptive dimension sampling-based finite difference method (SFD), and optimal frame selection method. In addition to these sequential attacks, they also propose other attacks on the the observations, action selection, and environment dynamics. The results of the proposed adversarial attacks are reported on DQN and DDPG based games and self-driving car simulator TORCS [66] , and they show a clear decline in rewards of the agent by both of attacks.
IV. DEFENSES AGAINST ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS ON DRL
In this section, we will provide a detailed review of the defenses proposed to deal with adversarial attacks on DRL. Figure 16 shows a basic taxonomy of the defenses that can be used for securing DRL algorithms. Table III summarizes key information of the proposed defenses for DRL algorithms.
A. Adversarial Training
Adversarial training includes retraining of the ML model using the adversarial examples along with the legitimate ex-amples. This increases the robustness of the ML model against adversarial examples as the model is now able to learn a better distribution. Although adversarial retraining can help improve the robustness of the ML model, the ML model can still be compromised through adversarial examples generated through some other methods. The goal of adversarial training is to improve the generalization outside of the training manifold. Kos et al. [54] present adversarial training as a method to make DRL algorithms robust against these attacks. They retrain their agent on perturbations generated using FGSM and randon noise. They show that after retraining their A3C agent (trained for playing Pong) becomes resilient to certain level of random noise and FGSM perturbations.
Pattanaik et al. [48] also adpot adversarial training as a measure to make the algorithms robust against the gradientbased attacks. They show its equivalence to Robust Control. They train the DRL model using the adversarial samples generated from the gradient-based attacks. This helps the algorithm to model uncertainties in the system making them robust to similar adversarial attacks. They show that the addition of noise to the training samples while training the model also increases the resilience of the DRL models against adversarial attacks. Furthermore, they also demonstrate the benefits of their technique by reporting its performance on DDQN and DDPG algorithms. Han et al. [46] also propose adversarial training as a method of robustifying the DRL algorithms against adversarial attacks.
Behzadan et al. [67] investigate the robustness of the DRL algorithms to both training and test time attacks. They show that under the training time attack the DQN can learn and become robust by changing the policy. They further show the adversarially-trained policies to be more robust to test-time attacks. They propose that for an agent to recover from these adversarial attacks, the number of the adversarial samples in the memory needs to reach a critical limit. In this way, when the agent samples a random batch from the memory, it can learn the perturbation statistics.
Later on, Behzadan et al. [68] compare the resilience to adversarial attacks of two DQNs: one based on -greedy policy learning and another employed NoisyNets [22] which is a parameter-space noise exploration technique. They test their proposed technique in three Atari games: Enduro, Assault, and Blackout. Their results show the NoisyNets to be more resilient to training-time attacks than that of the -greedy policy. They argue that this resilience in NoisyNets is due to the enhanced generalize-ability and reduced transferability. Chen et al. [63] propose a gradient-based adversarial training technique. They use adversarial perturbations generated using their proposed attacking algorithm, i.e., CDG, for re-training the RL agent. This approach can achieve a precision of 93.89% in detecting adversarial examples and hence prove that adversarial training using their method can realize the generalized attack immunity of A3C path finding with a high confidence. The architecture proposed by [63] is depicted in Figure 17 . Behzadan [63] is presented in this figure. For each map, it is shown whether the robot can reach its desired destination and the total time for path finding before and after adversarial perturbation. It is depicted that by adding "baffle-like" obstacles to the original map effectively disrupt the robot path finding. A3C ------Pattanaik et al. [48] DQN & DDPG ------Lin et al. [52] DQN & A3C ------Tretschk et al. [55] DQN ------Clark et al. [43] DQN ------Chen et al. [63] A3C ------Han et al. [46] DDQN & A3C ----Behzadan et al. [59] DQN, A2C & PPO -----Kiourti et al. [57] A2C ----Yeow et al. [50] PPO and DDQN ------Hussenot et al. [60] DQN & Rainbow [23] -----Xiao et al. [65] DQN & DDPG -----Huang et al. [47] Q-Learning ------Behzadan et al. [58] DQN -----Bai et al. [64] DQN ------Gleave et al. [61] PPO ------ of current adversarial training techniques. Their technique is based on a modified hybrid of the -greedy algorithm and the Boltzmann exploration. The new adversarial training procedure is tested on DQN trained for the CartPole environment with different perturbation probabilities. They show that for small perturbations probabilities, i.e., 0.2 and 0.4, the agent is able to recover from the attack while in the case of large probabilities like 0.8 or 1 the agent is not able to recover. They show that by using their technique for training, the agent is able to improve upon these short-comings. They compare the efficiency with -greedy and parameter-space noise exploration algorithms and prove its feasibility.
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B. Robust Learning
Robust learning is a training mechanism to ensure robustness against training-time adversarial attacks. Behzadan et al. [68] propose adding noise to the parameter state while training, this technique is found very effective in mitigating the effects of both training and test time attacks for both black-box and white-box settings. The results of the proposed method are tested on DQN trained for three Atari games, namely Enduro, Assault, and Blackout. In particular, the authors use FGSM for crafting adversarial samples. Then, they show the performance of the normal agents to deteriorate to almost no performance, while the ones which were retrained using the parameter noise show great performance even in the presence of adversarial inputs. Mandlekar et al. [70] show superior resilience to adversarial attacks by introducing an adversarially robust policy learning (ARPL) algorithm. This involves the use of adversarial examples during training to enable robust policy learning. The proposed mechanism is tested on TRPO based four games, namely InvertedPendulum, HalfCheetah, Hopper, and Walker and showed efficient performance under both random and adversarial perturbations. They show that their proposed algorithm in the case of adversarial attack performed almost the same as when trained. While in the case of agents which do not follow their learning technique the performance deteriorated drastically. It is important to note that the agent trained using the ARPL algorithm does not perform as well as the normal one in case of no perturbations.
Pinto et al. [71] propose Wasserstein robust reinforcement learning (W R 2 L) as a method of robust policy learning in the presence of an adversary. They formulate policy learning as a zero-sum minimax objective function to ensure robustness to differences in test and train conditions, even in the presence of adversary. This shows the presence of generalization which is necessary for algorithms that are to be trained in simulations and tested in real environments. The proposed robust learning mechanism is tested on TRPO-based five games, namely InvertedPendulum, HalfCheetah, Hopper, Swimmer, and Walker2D and shows significant robustness to adversarial attacks. An adversary is introduced in the environment whose goal is to destabilize the RL agent. Then they perform ex-periments under different settings of the games and show the agent which is trained using their technique can work better than those of the normally trained agents. Abdullah et al. [72] propose a robust reinforcement learning using a novel minmax game with a Wasserstein constraint for a correct and convergent solver. This technique shows a significant increase in robustness in the case of both low and high-dimensional control tasks. This technique is experimented on three algorithms DDPG, TRPO, and PPO based gaming environments, namely CartPole, Hopper, Halfcheetah, and Walker2D. They also discuss that by using their technique the DDPG algorithms are not able to achieve significant performance improvement in robustness, even in the case of Inverted Pendulum. While the other two DRL schemes, i.e., TRPO and PPO, demonstrate acceptable performance and hence are reported in their results.
Smirnova et al. [73] propose a distributionally robust policy iteration scheme to restrict the agent from learning suboptimal policy while exploring in cases of high-dimensional state/action space. This induces a dynamic level of risk to stop the agent from taking sub-optimal actions. Their scheme is based on robust Bellman operators, which provide a lowerbound guarantee on the policy/state values. They also present distributionally robust soft actor-critic based on mixed exploration, acting conservatively in the short-term and exploring optimistically in a long run leading to an optimal policy. They show the usefulness of their proposed algorithm by providing experiments on Hopper and Walker2D. If the learned policy is robust to the changes in environment, then the policy also performs better against adversarial attacks based on the perturbations in the environment. Tessler et al. [74] propose probabilistic MDP (PR-MDP) and noisy action robust MDP (NR-MDP) as two new criteria for robustness. They modify the DDPG to form AR-DDPG for solving these MDPs. The proposed techniques are evaluated in various Mojuco environments and the results prove that the learning of action-robust policies can help in making the proposed algorithms secure and perform better even in the absence of these perturbations.
Kumar et al. [75] present a technique to make the DRL algorithm learn in the presence of noisy rewards. The proposed scheme is based on using a noise filter based on a non-linear approximator to filter out the noise and estimate the reward. They test their proposed technique using DDQNs and show that the solution can filter a considerable amount of noise, up to 50% perturbation.
C. Adversarial Detection
Adversarial detection involves the detection of adversarial samples using a model specially trained to segregate the true samples from the adversarial ones. In this way, we can disregard the adversarial inputs without modifying the original model. Lin et al. [76] propose a method of protecting the DRL algorithms from adversarial attacks by leveraging an actionconditioned frame prediction module. By using this technique, they can detect the presence of adversarial attacks and make the model robust by using the predicted frame instead of the adversarial frame. They also compare their results with other ML defense approaches to show the effectiveness of this technique. To prove their technique, they provide their results on 5 Atari games: Pong, Freeway, Sea-quest, Chopper-Command, and Ms-Pacman. The techniques used for adversarial example generation are FGSM, Carlini & Wagner [53] , and Basic Iterative Method [84] . The present results indicate that their proposed technique is able to detect the adversarial attacks with the accuracy from 60% to 100%.
Havens et al. [77] introduce a technique of making the online algorithm robust to adversarial attacks. They detect the presence of adversarial attacks via a supervisory agent by learning separate sub-policies using the Meta-learned Advantage Hierarchy (MLAH) framework. Because this technique can handle the attacks in decision space, it can mitigate the learned bias introduced by the adversary. They consider a policy learning problem that is being attacked at specific periods. The goal of the adversary is the corruption of statespace while the agent trains. The supervisory agent aims to mitigate the effect of the bias introduced by the adversary.
They assume that while training, the agent learns sub-policies before learning the ultimate policy. Thus, the supervisory agent is able to detect the presence of the adversarial examples due to the being in unexpected states.
Xiang et al. [78] propose an advanced Q-learning algorithm for automatic path-finding in robots, that is robust to adversarial attacks by detecting the adversarial inputs. Specifically, they propose a model to predict the adversarial inputs based on a calculation determined by 5 factors: energy point gravitation, key point gravitation, path gravitation, included angle, and the placid point. The weights for these 5 factors are calculated based on the principle component analysis (PCA). Using these factors, they train a model able to achieve a precision of 70% in segregating adversarial inputs from the normal ones.
Wang et al. [79] propose a reward confusion matrix to generate rewards to help the RL agent to learn in cases of perturbed/noisy inputs. Such rewards are called to be Perturbed Rewards. Using these perturbed rewards, they are able to develop an unbiased reward estimator aided robust RL framework. Their algorithm not only achieves higher expected rewards but also converges faster. They experiment their technique extensively using several DRL algorithms (Q-Learning, CEM, SARSA, DQN, Dueling DQN, DDPG, NAF, and PPO) which are trained for different classic Atari gaming environments (CartPole, Pendulum, AirRaid, Alien, Carnival, MsPacman, Pong, Phoenix, Seaquest). They are able to achieve a 67.5% and 46.7% improvements in average when the error rate is 10% and 30%, respectively in the case of PPO. They also discuss both the cases of the perturbations added to some samples and perturbations being added to all samples.
Gallego et al. [80] introduce threatened Markov decision processes (TMDPs), a variant of MDP. This framework supports the decision-making process in DRL setting against adversaries that affect the reward generating process. They propose a level-k thinking scheme resulting in a new framework for dealing with TMDPs. They show that while a normal Q-learning algorithm is exploited by an adversary, a level-2 learner is able to approximately estimate the adversarial behaviour and achieve a positive reward. Integrating DQNs to TMDPs can also be a future research path.
D. Defensive Distillation
Papernot et al. [85] propose the idea of using defensive distillation to deal with adversarial attacks on ML schemes. Defensive distillation is a training method where a model is trained to predict the output probabilities of another model which is trained on the baseline standard to give more importance to accuracy. Carlini et al. [86] show that defensive distillation give false sense of robustness against adversarial examples. Rusu et al. [87] present a method of extracting the policy of a dense network to train another comparatively less dense network. This new network can take expert-level decisions while being smaller in size. This method can also be used to merge multiple task-specific policies into a single policy. They use their technique on multiple Atari games and prove their claims by showing a superior performance in the [63] Gradient Band-Based Adversarial Training Gradient Band Based Adversarial Attacks Behzadan et al. [68] Noisy Exploration State Perturbation Attacks Mandlekar et al. [70] Adversarially Robust Policy Learning (ARPL) State Perturbation Attacks Pinto et al. [71] Robust Adversarial Reinforcement Learning (RARL) Attacks Targeting the Performance Lin et al. [76] Action-conditioned Frame Prediction Module Attacks Perturbing the States Havens et al. [77] Meta-learned Advantage Hierarchy (MLAH) Training-Time Poisoning Attacks Xiang et al. [78] PCA for Adversarial Detection Attacks Perturbing the States Wang et al. [79] Reward Confusion Matrix Attacks Perturbing the Rewards Gallego et al. [80] Threatened Markov Decision Processes (TMDPs) Attacks Affecting Reward Generation Bravo et al. [81] Game-Theoretic Approach Noise Based Attacks Ogunmolu et al. [82] Game-Theoretic Approach Attacks Targeting the Policy Behzadan et al. [83] Benchmarking Generic Adversarial Attacks Behzadan et al. [58] Water Marking Model Extraction Attacks Behzadan et al. [69] Adversarially Guided Exploration (AGE) Limited Attack Samples Abdullah et al. [72] Wasserstein Robust Reinforcement Learning (W R 2 L) Generic Adversarial Attacks Smirnova et al. [73] Distributionally Robust Policy Iteration Attacks Targeting the Policy Tessler et al. [74] PR-MDPs & NR-MDPs Generic Adversarial Attacks Kumar et al. [75] Noise Filter Attacks Perturbing the Rewards less dense networks. They show that the distilled agents which were 4 times smaller than DQNs were able to achieve better performance than DQN. They also show that the agents having 25 times less parameters than DQN were able to achieve a performance of 84% as compared to the 100% of the DQN. Such networks are proved to be more stable and robust to adversarial noise and attacks, as they have less parameters than their denser counterparts and hence decreasing the places the adversary can target in order to achieve the adversarial goal.
Recently, Czarnecki et al. [88] have reported a study utilizing distillation in which the authors analyzed empirically and theoretically each variant of distillation and reported their strengths and weaknesses. Furthermore, they also propose expected entropy regularized distillation which makes the training much faster while guaranteeing convergence. This technique can be used in making the DRL models robust to adversarial attacks by leveraging learning information from a complex model into a simpler one. Hence, making the models robust to adversarial attacks. However, as discussed by Carlini et al. [86] , using this technique alone may not be effective. It needs to be combined with other approaches, like adversarial training, adversarial detection etc., in order to be successful.
E. Game theoretic approach
Bravo et al. [81] examine a game approach where the players adjust their actions based on past payoff observations that are subject to adversarial perturbations. In the singleplayer case containing an agent trying to adapt to an arbitrarily changing environment, they show that irrespective of the level of noise in the player's observations, the stochastic dynamics under study lead to no regret almost surely. In the case of multiple players, they show that the dominated strategies become extinct and the strict Nash equilibrium are stochastically stable and attractive. Conversely, a stable or attractive state with positive probability is the Nash equilibrium. Finally, they provide with an averaging principle and show that in the case of 2player zero-sum games with an interior equilibrium, the time averages converge to Nash equilibrium for any noise level. Ogunmolu et al. [82] proposed an iterative minimax dynamic game framework that helps in designing robust policies in the presence of adversarial inputs. They also propose a method of quantifying the robustness capacity of a policy. They evaluate their proposed framework on a mecanum-wheeled robot. The goal of this agent is to find a locally robust optimal multistage policy that achieves a given goal-reaching task.
V. METRICS, TOOLS, AND PLATFORMS FOR BENCHMARKING DRL
As we have previously discussed, DRL is different from other ML schemes, and only reporting the accuracy is not sufficient to cover security aspects of the DRL schemes. In particular, we need to keep in mind the temporal domain aspect of the DRL while designing the DRL-based attack or defense. Benchmarking the DRL performance in attacks and defenses is very important. The need for an applicable solution to evaluate the robustness and resilience of DRL policies is not fulfilled by the current literature. There is also a need for a quantitative approach to measure and benchmark the resilience and robustness of DRL policies in a reusable and generalizable manner.
There are few benchmarks proposed, but they are not sufficient to cover the security aspects needed to measure the robustness and resilience of DRL algorithms. The few proposed approaches are discussed in this section. Behzadan et al. [89] introduce the terms of adversarial budget and adversarial regret as a measure to quantify the robustness and resilience of DRL algorithms. Adversarial budget is defined as the maximum number of features that can be perturbed in the observation, and the probability of perturbing each observation. The adversarial regret is the difference between the reward obtained by the unperturbed agent and the reward obtained by the perturbed agent after an episode. On the basis of these two terms, Behzadan et al. [89] define test-time resilience and test-time robustness.
A. Test-time Resilience and Robustness
Test-time resilience is described as the minimum number of perturbations required to incur the maximum reduction to reward at time t, while Test-time robustness is described as the maximum achievable adversarial regret.
The following procedure was proposed to measure test-time resilience for DRL algorithms:
• Approximate the state-action value function using policy imitation in case it is not already given. • Report the optimal adversarial return and maximum adversarial regret by training the adversarial agent against the target's policy. • Apply the obtained adversarial policy to the target for several episodes while recording the reward for each. • Report the average adversarial reward over these episodes as the mean test-time resilience of the target policy. The method of measuring the test-time robustness is the same as test-time resilience. The only difference is that in the test-time case we measure the average adversarial regret in place of the average adversarial reward.
Behzadan et al. [83] propose a novel framework for benchmarking the behavior of DRL-based collision avoidance mechanisms under the worst-case scenario of dealing with an adversarial agent which is trained to drive the system into unsafe states. They prove the practical applicability of the technique by comparing the reliability of two collision avoidance systems against intentional collision attempts. More recently, Behzadan et al. [58] have presented a technique for watermarking DRL policies for robustness against model extraction attacks. This involves the integration of a unique response to a specific sequence of states while keeping its impact on performance minimum hence saving from the unauthorized replication of policies. Then, they prove their technique by experimenting on a DQN trained in a CartPole environment. It is shown that unwatermarked policies are not able to follow the identified trajectory. Table III provides a summary of the available defenses against adversarial attacks on DRL.
B. Metrics for Attack Performance
Kiourti et al. [57] , introduce three metrics for measuring the performance of the DRL attacks, namely (1) performance Gap, (2) percentage of target action and (3) time to failure. As the name suggests, the performance gap is the difference between the performance of the normal and the victim model. For the second metric (percentage of target action), they measure the number of times the adversarial/targeted action is performed by the victim policy. The third metric (time to failure) is the number of consecutive states that need to be perturbed to trigger a complete failure of the model.
As observed, these proposed measurement techniques can only cover a part of the DRL algorithms, and hence are not sufficient for measuring the performance of the DRL algorithms under the wide range of adversarial attacks and defenses. There is therefore a need for the development of benchmarks that can be used as standards for DRL algorithms as a measure of their resilience and robustness to adversarial attacks.
C. Attacking DRL: Tools and Platforms
DRL can be implemented using several toolkits available. OpenAIGym [90] and Tensorflow [91] which provide integrating mechanisms in order to implement DRL models. RLCoach [92] and Horizon [93] are similar toolkit available for testing DRL algorithms on different games. NS3GYM [94] provides us with network environments. Combining these toolkits for implementing RL (discussed in the previous section) with the toolkits available for attacking DL [95] and DRL [67] , we can test different attacks on our algorithms in simulated environments.
VI. OPEN ISSUES AND RESEARCH CHALLENGES
Despite a lot of defenses are proposed, the security of DRL algorithms remains an open challenge. The proposed defenses are only able to defend from attacks they are designed for. Hence, they are still vulnerable to attacks led by a proactive adversary. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [96] point out that no matter how many adversarial examples are added to the training data, there are new adversarial examples that can be generated to cheat those newly trained networks. Moreover, if the adversary is only targeting confidence levels then we may never be able to detect the attack until the adversary uses his created deficiency for his benefit. We may not be even able to trace the attacks as shown by Clark et al. [43] . Thus, methods to make the DRL algorithms more robust are urgent need.
A. Multitask Learning
One of the major challenges for RL is learning to do multiple tasks at a single time. It requires a lot of samples for this. Currently, proposed RL algorithms can only learn to perform one task perfectly. They can be trained to play multiple games (like Cartpole, Inverted Pendulum etc.), but they need to be trained from scratch for each game. The algorithms are expected to be scalable and be more generalizable, so that their learning can be transferred from one game to another. Multitask learning can help us in making robust models that can grip the true essence of the tasks and hence become difficult to be fooled.
B. Metrics for Robustness and Resilience
We need to study why vulnerabilities exist in the DRL models and how can we mitigate them and train robust models.
A major reason for the existence of these vulnerabilities is the use of DRL models without the proper knowledge of the domain. There is a need to properly define the benchmarks of DRL in terms of robustness of DRL against adversarial attacks. Behzadan et al. [89] recently have proposed techniques of quantifying the robustness and resilience of the RL algorithms. Some benchmarks are also proposed by Kiourti et al. [57] but as previously discussed these benchmarks are inadequate to measure the robustness and resilience of an algorithm even though they can be used as stepping stones to lead us to a final goal.
C. System Design and Transferability
System design remains an open challenge for the case of DRL. There is a need to define standards for system design for DRL problems as in this case the learning process is not supervised. So, the agent may not focus on the features that it needs to learn. This can introduce the error by mistake of the intermediary and also even induce his behavior on the model. We need to have proper standards for designing the reward functions. The system design needs to be robust and resilient to adversarial attacks.
D. Ensemble of Defenses
A lot of ensemble defenses have been proposed for the case of DL. However, they may not be appropriate to apply in the case of DRL as it can lead to an exponential increase in the complexity of the model which results in significant decrease in performance. In the case of DRL, the model is making real-time prediction, so a small reduction in the computation capabilities may cause a great loss to the agent. This remains a challenge to defend our model using an ensemble with a minimum loss of computations.
Model-extraction attacks pose a serious threat to the integrity of the learned models e.g. illegal duplication. The only mitigation, as suggested by Behzadan et al. [59] , is to increase the cost of such attacks or to watermark the policies. We may experience some randomness in the agent to save from such attacks but that will incur an unacceptable loss of decreased performance. Developing techniques that can incur constrained randomization in the model to save from such attacks is a promising field of research.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The broadening applicability of DRL in the real world has diverged our concern to the security of these algorithms against adversarial attacks. This paper has provided a comprehensive survey of the latest techniques proposed for attacking the DRL algorithms and the defenses proposed for defending the DRL algorithms against these attacks. We have also discussed the open research issues and provided the list of available benchmarks for measuring the resilience and robustness of DRL algorithms. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper which presents a comprehensive survey of the state-ofthe-art literature on adversarial attacks on DRL.
